H.R. 6058 — STRIDE Act

This section expresses the sense of Congress that (1) the global semiconductor technology supply chain is critical to U.S. and allied national security, economic competitiveness, and technological leadership; (2) the Chinese Communist Party pursues dominance of the semiconductor industry through non-market practices, export control violations, economic espionage, military-civil fusion, and predatory investment to support military modernization and human rights abuses; (3) supply chain integrity requires coordinated action with allies and partners to prevent technological capture by the Chinese Communist Party and other foreign adversaries; (4) unilateral U.S. export controls on critical semiconductor technologies can be amplified through multilateral coordination; and (5) fully utilizing certain U.S. export control authorities, including the Foreign Direct Product Rule, effectively prevents circumvention through third-country production.

This section states the policy of the United States to (1) maintain U.S. and allied technological leadership in semiconductor technology research, design, manufacturing, and advanced materials; (2) prevent adversarial capture of key chokepoints in the global semiconductor supply chain; (3) coordinate with allied and partner nations to expand and enhance semiconductor technology protection; (4) ensure that U.S.-origin technology and intellectual property do not contribute to the Chinese Communist Party's military modernization, human rights abuses, or pursuit of technological dominance; and (5) promote resilient, secure, and trusted semiconductor supply chains among U.S. allies and partners.

This section directs the Secretary of State to coordinate with governments of countries maintaining significant capabilities in semiconductor technology research, design, manufacturing, materials, equipment, or subsystems and components to protect such technologies from acquisition by the Chinese Communist Party and other foreign adversaries of the U.S. and its allies and partners. In pursuing this coordination, the Secretary must seek to achieve six objectives: (1) alignment of export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment (e.g., lithography systems, etching tools) and critical subcomponents; (2) expanded restrictions on design tools, intellectual property transfers, equipment servicing, and technical assistance; (3) harmonized controls on dual-use materials (e.g., photoresists, specialty gases); (4) joint monitoring, enforcement, and administration to prevent circumvention and backfilling; (5) information sharing on risks, end-user verification, and supply chain threats; and (6) trusted supplier networks for components and services. If a cooperating country implements insufficient security measures to prevent transfers to countries of concern (as defined in 10 U.S.C. 4872(f)), the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, must assess cooperation; explain deficiencies; within 21 days, request the Commerce Secretary to convene the Export Advisory Review Board to develop and execute a plan of action; and notify appropriate congressional committees within 30 days with routine updates. The Secretary of State must also recommend to the board enhanced Foreign Direct Product Rule restrictions (i.e., U.S. export controls on foreign-produced items using U.S.-origin technology, software, or equipment), Entity List (i.e., Bureau of Industry and Security restrictions) expansions for at-risk entities in the non-cooperating country, and steps to prevent backfilling of U.S. technology to restricted sectors. Not later than 90 days after enactment and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State must submit unclassified reports (with classified annexes if needed) to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs detailing diplomatic engagement status, progress on objectives, non-cooperation determinations, and coordination effectiveness.