H.R. 5167 — Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026

This section specifies that the amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the federal government are those detailed in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the Act. It requires the Schedule's availability to the Senate and House Appropriations Committees and the President (for suitable distribution within the executive branch) and prohibits the President from publicly disclosing the Schedule or portions thereof except as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a)) (i.e., aggregate National Intelligence Program budget request disclosure), to the extent necessary to implement the budget, or as otherwise required by law.

This section authorizes appropriations of $674,500,000 for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for FY2026, plus additional classified amounts as specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). (The account funds Office of the Director of National Intelligence operations and certain intelligence community-wide management, analysis, and oversight activities.)

This section (1) revises the definition of counterintelligence under the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(3)) to encompass activities to deter, disrupt, investigate, exploit, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers or international terrorists (previously, protect against such threats only); and (2) establishes within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a National Counterintelligence Center (NCIC) to direct, coordinate, and execute counterintelligence activities. The NCIC is headed by a Director appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, who serves as principal counterintelligence advisor to the President and Director of National Intelligence, reports to the Director of National Intelligence, and may exercise specified personnel authorities. The Director must also establish a National Counterintelligence Task Force chaired by the NCIC Director and comprising designees from intelligence community elements, other federal entities, and others as appropriate to perform assigned duties. The NCIC Director must lead federal efforts to (1) counter, deny, disrupt, and degrade foreign intelligence operations; (2) deceive, exploit, and shape foreign intelligence activities; (3) coordinate and direct counterintelligence operations; (4) conduct strategic planning; (5) counter foreign influence and denial/deception; (6) assess threats and gaps; (7) mitigate risks; (8) produce intelligence products; (9) evaluate capabilities; (10) resolve anomalies; (11) integrate data and expertise; and (12) provide counterintelligence education and training. Additional duties include establishing collection requirements and standards, evaluating program effectiveness, engaging international partners, conducting damage assessments and polygraphs, creating a centralized foreign threat database, supporting non-intelligence community agencies, and conducting outreach to state, local, tribal governments, and private-sector entities.

This section establishes transition provisions related to the redesignation of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center as the National Counterintelligence Center (NCC). It (1) redesignates the center and permits its current director to continue serving until a successor is presidentially appointed with Senate confirmation; (2) directs the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to brief congressional intelligence committees within 180 days and submit a report within one year assessing whether specified security functions—DNI's role as Security Executive Agent (i.e., oversight of investigations, reinvestigations, adjudications, and polygraphs for classified information access or sensitive positions under 50 U.S.C. 3162a), joint leadership of the National Insider Threat Task Force, and functions of the NCC's Special Security Directorate and Center for Security Evaluation—should reside with the NCC director or another official; (3) requires the DNI to transfer counterintelligence functions and personnel within the Office of the DNI to the NCC within 90 days; (4) authorizes the NCC director, for 180 days, to transfer personnel or reprogram National Intelligence Program funds for new title IV authorities (as added by section 302), subject to notifications within 30 days to specified congressional committees; and (5) clarifies that no new National Counterintelligence Task Force is required if the existing task force meets or is modified to meet section 403 requirements (as added by section 302), and directs an NCC director report within 90 days of task force establishment detailing its prior activities since January 1, 2020, and future organization and plans.

This section makes conforming amendments to intelligence laws by (1) repealing Section 103F of the National Security Act of 1947 and Sections 902 and 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002; (2) replacing all references to "National Counterintelligence and Security Center" with "National Counterintelligence Center" throughout specified provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 and other laws (e.g., 5 U.S.C. 5315, 41 U.S.C. 1322(b)(1)(D)); (3) amending budget submission requirements in Section 506(a)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 to refer to "The National Counterintelligence Program" (from "Counterintelligence"); and (4) redesignating the reporting provision on Chinese influence operations (Section 1107) as Section 435 and transferring it after Section 434, and redesignating the reporting provision on Russian influence operations (Section 1108) as Section 436 after new Section 435.

This section provides that the authorizations of appropriations in this Act do not constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

This section authorizes supplemental appropriations, as necessary, for increases in federal employee salaries, pay, retirement, and other benefits authorized by law.

This section revises the Director of National Intelligence's (DNI) delegation authority under 50 U.S.C. 3024(n)(6)(C) for elements of the intelligence community to enter into certain acquisitions, leases, or other transactions without regard to specified laws (1) by authorizing the DNI to delegate such authority to the head of an intelligence community element; and (2) by allowing the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), if delegated such authority, to apply a higher threshold of $500 million (from $75 million) upon submitting notice to the congressional intelligence committees at least 14 days prior to entering the agreement or transaction and certifying its essentiality to critical national security objectives. (Thus, this enhances NRO acquisition flexibility for space-based intelligence capabilities.)

This section requires the heads of specified elements of the intelligence community—Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation intelligence elements, Department of Energy Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis—to designate a senior official responsible for the element's biotechnology-related activities, with initial designations due within 90 days of enactment and notice to the congressional intelligence committees within 15 days of each designation.

This section prohibits the use of DeepSeek or successor applications or services developed or provided by High-Flyer or successor entities (i.e., covered applications) on national security systems operated by elements of the intelligence community (IC), IC contractors, or other entities on behalf of the IC. It directs the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), in consultation with other IC heads, to develop standards and guidelines requiring removal of covered applications, consistent with federal information security requirements under subchapter II of chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code (i.e., FISMA); includes exceptions for national security purposes and research activities, with applicable risk mitigation standards; and requires the DNI to issue initial standards and guidelines within 60 days of enactment. (National security systems, as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3552(b)(6), include information systems involving intelligence or cryptologic activities related to national security, command and control of military forces, integral weapon systems components, or other systems critical to agency missions.)

This section establishes a knowledge management system for international cartels and other transnational criminal organizations. It requires the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), in consultation with the Attorney General, to ensure the intelligence community uses the Transnational Organized Crime Identity Intelligence Platform or a successor system to enable information management, sharing, analysis, and collaboration across the intelligence community and with federal law enforcement agencies; and to provide all terrorism information—including that related to such cartels or organizations designated as foreign terrorist organizations or Specially Designated Global Terrorists—to the National Counterterrorism Center. The DNI and Attorney General must issue procedures for data collection, storage, access, dissemination, organization, and security to promote collaboration; each intelligence community element must input relevant data into the system and share terrorism information with the National Counterterrorism Center; and the DNI and Attorney General must provide semi-annual briefings to the congressional intelligence committees through 2028 on the system's effectiveness, challenges, compliance, and federal law enforcement participation.

This section requires the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with other intelligence community elements, to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a notice within 30 days of a covered closure of a U.S. diplomatic or consular post abroad describing its impact on intelligence community activities. The notice must include (1) a description of such impact, if any; (2) a plan to mitigate adverse effects; and (3) details on whether the Director and relevant elements were consulted in the closure decision and registered any concerns or objections. A covered closure is one anticipated to last, or that has lasted, 60 days or longer.

This section directs the President, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment, to issue or update policies applicable to the entire intelligence community with respect to using classified information to train or refine artificial intelligence models for intelligence community use. The policies must seek to maximize, to the greatest extent practicable, the amount of such data used—including information classified at the most sensitive levels—consistent with protecting it from unauthorized use and in accordance with existing laws.

This section requires the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with heads of other intelligence community (IC) elements, to issue guidance within 90 days of enactment to prioritize completion of reviews for authorizations to operate (ATO) artificial intelligence capabilities under evaluation in the IC. It further requires each IC element head to notify the congressional intelligence committees within 7 days if an AI ATO review exceeds 60 days, with such notification requirement sunsetting five years after enactment.

This section directs the Directors of National Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and Defense Intelligence Agency to develop and implement, not later than 270 days after enactment, agency-specific processes using a single set of metrics and methodologies to assess agency-wide adoption, integration, and operational impact of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. Such metrics must assess (1) safety and security, (2) effectiveness and efficiency, and (3) impact on mission risk or likelihood of success. Not later than one year after enactment, each agency head must brief the congressional intelligence committees on implementation, including the metrics established, progress toward meeting them, and recommendations for legislative or regulatory reforms to improve technology adoption.

This section directs the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), acting through the Artificial Intelligence Security Center (or successor office), to develop an “AI Security Playbook” to defend covered AI technologies—defined as advanced AI systems with critical capabilities (e.g., matching or exceeding human expert performance in chemical or biological domains) that would pose a grave national security threat if stolen by threat actors—from technology theft. The playbook must include (1) identification of cybersecurity vulnerabilities unique to advanced AI data centers and developers; (2) components or information (e.g., AI models, training insights, engineering data) that could advance threat actors' AI development if accessed; (3) strategies to detect, prevent, and respond to cyber threats; (4) security levels requiring substantial U.S. government involvement; and (5) analysis of such involvement, including a hypothetical initiative for government-built secure AI systems addressing cybersecurity, model weights protection, insider threats, network controls, and counterintelligence. The playbook must contain a classified annex with detailed methodologies and intelligence assessments and an unclassified portion with general guidelines for private sector use. In developing it, the Director must engage prominent AI developers and researchers (via document reviews, interviews, roundtables, facility visits), collaborate with a federally funded research and development center expert in AI model security, and consult agencies such as the Bureau of Industry and Security, NIST’s Center for AI Standards and Innovation, DHS, and DOD; such activities are exempt from the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The Director must submit an initial report on playbook progress, outline, and insights to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees within 180 days of enactment and a final report within one year (with unclassified, publicly available versions and optional classified annex). No provision authorizes or requires regulatory or enforcement actions.

This section defines three terms for purposes of this title: (1) "commercially available information" as information customarily made available or obtainable, sold, leased, or licensed to the general public or non-governmental entities for nongovernmental purposes, or information intended for exclusive government use that is knowingly and voluntarily provided by, procured from, or made accessible by a non-governmental entity; (2) "open-source intelligence" as intelligence derived exclusively from publicly available information or commercially available information; and (3) "publicly available information" as information that is published or broadcast for public consumption, available on request to the public (including by subscription or purchase), accessible to the public, observable by any casual observer, made available at a public meeting, or observed by visiting a public place or attending a public event.

This section establishes a new section 124 in the National Security Act of 1947 requiring the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with heads of other intelligence community elements, to ensure the community's efficient and effective use of open-source intelligence by (1) designating one or more officials responsible for implementation, standardization, and harmonization in areas including training and tradecraft, technology innovation, data acquisition and sharing, collection management, partnerships with non-IC entities, and standards and governance; (2) minimizing duplication of open-source intelligence activities and funding allocations; and (3) ensuring appropriate coordination, documentation, and disclosure of such efforts. It repeals a prior, less detailed provision requiring efficient use of open-source information and analysis (50 U.S.C. 3367), includes a rule of construction preserving applicable privacy and civil liberties laws, and defines open-source intelligence by reference to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026.

This section requires the Director of National Intelligence to designate an official within the intelligence community to oversee the acquisition and management of commercially available information (CAI) by intelligence community elements. The designated official must (1) ensure deconfliction of CAI acquisitions; (2) prevent unnecessary duplicative acquisitions; (3) maximize interoperability, data sharing, and minimize acquisition costs; (4) coordinate information requirements between intelligence community elements and CAI vendors to develop clear specifications on features, quality standards, performance indicators, delivery timelines, and other details; (5) document such requirements in common formats for shared understanding; (6) establish an evaluation methodology for procurement metrics; and (7) perform other duties as directed by the Director. The official must brief the congressional intelligence committees on CAI acquisitions not later than May 31, 2027, and annually thereafter for two years. CAI has the meaning given in section 601 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026.

This section amends the responsibilities of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) concerning open-source intelligence (OSINT) activities (i.e., intelligence analysis derived from publicly available information) by (1) prohibiting heads of intelligence community elements from transferring, reprogramming, or reducing OSINT funds without prior DNI approval, unless the amounts are below thresholds established by the DNI for such actions; and (2) requiring the DNI to conduct regular oversight of OSINT activities across the intelligence community, evaluate their effectiveness, and ensure budget submissions include OSINT-related information.

This section amends budget justification requirements for the National Intelligence Program (NIP) by adding a fifth category—acquisition or use for intelligence purposes of publicly available information (as defined in section 601 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026), commercially available information (as defined in such section), or other open-source information—for which aggregate funding amounts must be separately identified in materials submitted to Congress for FY2027 through FY2029 and any additional fiscal years the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) considers appropriate. For this new category, such materials must include (1) a summary of primary activities and investments supported; (2) disaggregation of the requested amount by program, budget category, expenditure center or subproject, and other classifications as determined by the DNI; (3) a comparison of the requested amount to the amount made available in the preceding fiscal year; (4) the number of full-time equivalent civilian and military personnel assigned to open-source intelligence duties by program and across the intelligence community; and (5) other information as the DNI considers appropriate. The section also broadens the DNI's authority to provide information required under the provision in classified or unclassified form (previously limited to aggregate amounts under subsection (a)).

This section establishes a standardized training course on the collection of publicly available information and commercially available information for intelligence purposes, to be developed not later than one year after enactment by the official designated under section 125(a)(1)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947, in consultation with intelligence community element heads. Heads of each intelligence community element must require personnel whose duties include such collection to complete the course—within 180 days for current personnel after establishment or 90 days for new personnel after starting service—with completion transferable across elements; elements may also require additional or recurring open-source intelligence training.

This section establishes a requirement for the head of each element of the intelligence community to purge any publicly available information or commercially available information relating to a United States person that is incidentally collected by such element. Publicly available information and commercially available information have the meanings given in section 601 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, and United States person has the meaning given in section 105A of the National Security Act of 1947.

This section requires the Director of National Intelligence, not later than 180 days after enactment, to review and update three Intelligence Community Directives to ensure the effective and efficient use of open-source intelligence: (1) Intelligence Community Directive 203, Analytic Standards, with respect to timeliness, source availability, and analytic standards for publicly available information, commercially available information, and other open-source information in finished intelligence products; (2) Intelligence Community Directive 206, Sourcing Requirements for Disseminated Analytic Products, by appending Intelligence Community Standard 206-01 on citations and references for such information and directing intelligence community elements to review tradecraft, update as appropriate, and train analysts for compliance; and (3) Intelligence Community Directive 208, Maximizing the Utility of Analytic Products. The section withholds 2% of FY2026 funds authorized for the Intelligence Community Management Account until the Director submits to the congressional intelligence committees (1) notice of completion of updates required under subsection (d) of section 7321 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3367 note) and (2) the plan required under subsection (a) of such section. Upon completion, the section requires submission of the updated directives to the congressional intelligence committees.

This section requires the chief financial officer of each intelligence community element to audit all National Intelligence Program expenditures on publicly available information (PAI), commercially available information (CAI), or other open-source information for intelligence purposes and submit an accounting to the Intelligence Community Chief Financial Officer. It similarly requires the chief financial officer of each Department of Defense component using Military Intelligence Program funds to audit such expenditures and submit an accounting to the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). The Intelligence Community Chief Financial Officer and Under Secretary must brief the congressional intelligence and defense committees on these audits not later than (1) June 30, 2026, for FY2024 expenditures; (2) June 30, 2027, for FY2025; (3) June 30, 2028, for FY2026; (4) June 30, 2029, for FY2027; (5) June 30, 2030, for FY2028; and (6) June 30, 2031, for FY2029.

This section requires the head of each intelligence community element to provide quarterly briefings to the congressional intelligence committees during FY2026 and FY2027 on obligations of National Intelligence Program or Military Intelligence Program funds for procuring commercially available information during the prior fiscal quarter, including bulk data, application programming interfaces, or enterprise or limited software licenses.

This section directs the Director of National Intelligence to conduct a study, beginning not later than 30 days after enactment, on the most effective ways for the intelligence community to support open-source intelligence requirements of other federal departments and agencies. The study must (1) identify the principal intelligence community liaison for such assistance; (2) determine best practices for intelligence community elements to facilitate relationships with, and provide open-source intelligence resources to, other agencies; (3) review technical infrastructure connected to the intelligence community's information-sharing environment; and (4) outline processes for resolving information-sharing disputes between intelligence community elements and other agencies. Not later than 90 days after initiating the study, the Director must brief the congressional intelligence committees on the findings.

This section establishes requirements under a new title XII of the National Security Act of 1947 for unclassified performance appraisals of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) employees. Specifically, the DIA Director must ensure that (1) each appraisal includes unclassified narrative input and unclassified rating scores from each provider, furnished to the employee in unclassified form; and (2) for any employee terminating employment without such an appraisal in the prior 1.5 years, an appraisal is completed within 30 days after termination. The Director may waive these requirements for employees with classified affiliations. The unclassified appraisal requirement applies to appraisals on or after enactment, and the departing-employee requirement applies to terminations on or after enactment. This section also transfers existing sections 1104 and 1106 to title XII (as sections 1201 and 1202, respectively) and makes conforming amendments.

This section establishes a prohibition applicable to the head of each element of the intelligence community (i.e., the 18 agencies overseen by the Director of National Intelligence) against requiring covered individuals—such as applicants, employees, contractors, and detailees—to engage in political or ideological activism (i.e., affirmatively advocating political beliefs through speech, events, or group membership) as a condition for, or to receive preferential treatment in, positive personnel actions (e.g., appointments, promotions, pay decisions, performance evaluations, or avoidance of discipline). The prohibition includes an exception for activism required to maintain an individual's cover, as determined by the relevant agency head.

This section establishes requirements for merit-based personnel decisions in the intelligence community by prohibiting any personnel action (as defined in section 1104(a) of the National Security Act of 1947) from being motivated by (1) a desire to reverse societal discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, transgender status, or national origin; (2) a desire to provide role models to or aid recruitment of individuals of the same protected characteristics; or (3) a belief that certain viewpoints or experiences can be ascribed to a person based on those characteristics. A rule of construction clarifies that such factors may be considered where they constitute a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the job, including linguistic ability or background for maintaining cover.

This section amends the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act to establish that, for purposes of benefits administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), injuries or illnesses incurred or aggravated during covered service by a qualifying veteran are treated as incurred or aggravated in line of duty during active military, naval, air, or space service (as defined in 38 U.S.C. §101). (A qualifying veteran is a CIA employee who meets the definition of "veteran" in 38 U.S.C. §101 (i.e., served in active military, naval, air, or space service and was discharged or released under conditions other than dishonorable); covered service is Agency service meeting criteria specified in the classified annex to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 or any subsequent such Act.) (Thus, qualifying veterans may receive VA benefits such as disability compensation for such injuries or illnesses.) The provision applies to injuries or illnesses incurred or aggravated before, on, or after enactment.

This section requires the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), acting through the National Intelligence Council and National Intelligence Management Council and in consultation with other intelligence community elements, to conduct and regularly update net assessments (i.e., comparative analyses of relative strengths) of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) economic, technological, financial, trade, industrial, and diplomatic power relative to the United States and the national security implications of PRC activities in those areas. Such assessments must use open-source information for the U.S. portion and all-source information for the PRC portion and be made available, consistent with protecting sources and methods, to other federal agencies and the congressional intelligence committees. The DNI must submit the first assessment to the congressional intelligence committees not later than 180 days after enactment.

This section establishes within the National Intelligence Management Council (i.e., an Office of the Director of National Intelligence body composed of senior intelligence community officials and experts tasked with coordinating intelligence planning, programming, budgeting, collection, and analysis across the intelligence community) a National Intelligence Manager position for matters relating to the People's Republic of China. The Director of National Intelligence must appoint a council member to the position not later than 180 days after enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, subject to a waiver authority exercisable upon certification to the congressional intelligence committees that the appointment would not advance U.S. national security interests (with each waiver applying for a two-year period and renewable); the requirement terminates on December 31, 2030.

This section directs the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, to produce a National Intelligence Estimate on advancements by the People's Republic of China in biotechnology and any other significant technology or science sector the Director considers related, and to submit it to the congressional intelligence committees not later than one year after enactment.

This section amends Section 6512 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3025 note), which requires the Director of National Intelligence to designate a coordinator within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to oversee intelligence community efforts on accountability for war crimes and atrocities by Russia in Ukraine, by (1) adding to the coordinator's duties under subsection (b)(2)(A) activities related to the forcible transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children; (2) extending a date in subsection (b)(4)(A) to 2028 (from 2026); and (3) revising the termination provision in subsection (c) to December 31, 2028 (from four years after enactment of that Act) and requiring implementation through that date regardless of any ceasefire or cessation of armed hostilities by Russia in Ukraine.

This section directs the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, acting through the Center for the Study of Intelligence, to submit to the congressional intelligence committees not later than two years after the date of enactment a study on the intelligence community's historical approach since 2010 to collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence on the risk of and commission of atrocities worldwide. The study must examine (1) prioritization of such intelligence, including its placement on the National Intelligence Priorities Framework; (2) responsiveness to policymakers; (3) prior assessments, including national intelligence estimates and the Intelligence Community Atrocities Watchlist; (4) assessed utility of those assessments to policymakers; (5) observable trends in such matters; (6) effects of the coordinator for Russian atrocities accountability; (7) effects of the coordinator for atrocities accountability of the People's Republic of China; and (8) other related matters as determined appropriate by the Director. The study must include an unclassified executive summary.

This section directs the Director of National Intelligence to ensure that relevant elements of the intelligence community provide the Government of Ukraine with intelligence support—including information, intelligence, and imagery collection authorized under applicable law—sufficient to enable robust operations to defend and retake Ukrainian territory from Russia, unless the Director determines a compelling interest exists not to provide such support. It further requires each intelligence community element to notify the congressional intelligence committees within seven days of any interruption in such support.

This section amends subsection (b) of section 145 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2165(b)), which restricts access to Restricted Data (i.e., specific nuclear weapons-related information classified under the act), to exempt the President, Vice President, Members of Congress, and justices or judges of the United States (as defined in 28 U.S.C. 451, including Supreme Court justices, courts of appeals judges, district judges, Court of International Trade judges, and judges of other Article III courts). It directs the Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence or the Security Executive Agent, beginning not later than 90 days after enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, to (1) maintain an up-to-date list of such individuals and (2) verify their authorization to access Restricted Data in coordination with relevant security officials (e.g., Sergeants at Arms for Members of Congress) using no more personally identifying information than required for classified information access. It further requires the Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence or the Security Executive Agent, to notify the congressional intelligence committees not later than 120 days after enactment of this Act on the status of implementing these requirements.

This section revises congressional notification requirements for National Security Agency (NSA) intelligence collection or sharing adjustments under 50 U.S.C. 3620 as follows: (1) modifies the trigger in subsection (a) from an "intelligence collection adjustment" (previously, a U.S. government policy change resulting in a significant loss of intelligence) to a "covered intelligence collection or sharing adjustment," and requires the NSA Director to submit a summary of the adjustment and its cause (instead of a notification); and (2) redefines the term in subsection (b)(2) to mean an NSA action or inaction resulting in a significant change to (A) the quantity of intelligence collected with respect to a foreign country, foreign organization, or senior leader thereof, or (B) NSA policies or practices for sharing intelligence with a foreign country, organization of foreign countries, or organization of countries of which the United States is a member. (Thus, the provision expands notifications beyond collection losses to include collection increases or decreases and intelligence sharing changes, while limiting applicability to NSA actions and requiring more detailed reporting.)

This section amends Section 506 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3096) to require the Director of National Intelligence to annually develop a consolidated Intelligence Community Drug Control Program Budget and, not later than 30 days after submitting classified National Intelligence Program budget justification materials for a fiscal year, submit to the congressional intelligence committees a summary organized similarly to the National Drug Control Program budget summary required of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (21 U.S.C. 1703(c)). The summary must include (1) a certification that the budget implements intelligence community responsibilities supporting U.S. counter-drug efforts as reflected in the National Drug Control Strategy (21 U.S.C. 1705) and National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (21 U.S.C. 1710(a)(4)); (2) key intelligence community counternarcotics accomplishments for the current and previous fiscal years; (3) total amounts requested for National Intelligence Program counternarcotics activities for the fiscal year covered and the previous fiscal year; (4) such amounts disaggregated by intelligence community element at the expenditure center, project, and subproject levels; and (5) other information as the Director determines appropriate. This section also revises the heading of Section 506 to include reference to the new budget requirement and, as a conforming amendment, shortens a date in Section 7320(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 from 2027 to 2026.

This section repeals the requirement for the Secretary of the Treasury to submit annual reports to congressional committees on operations against terrorist financial networks (i.e., asset seizures, designations, physical searches of suspected terrorist financiers, and intelligence sharing). It also makes a conforming amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 by striking a paragraph and redesignating another in the general reporting schedule provision.

This section repeals or modifies multiple outdated or unnecessary reporting requirements in the National Security Act of 1947, Intelligence Authorization Acts, and other laws. **(a) National Security Act of 1947** (1) repeals section 114 on hiring and retention of minority employees; (2) for the Foreign Malign Influence Center (sec. 119C), strikes subsection (d) and redesignates subsection (e) as (d); (3) for counterintelligence and national security protections for intelligence community grant funding (sec. 121), strikes subsection (c); (4) revises authorization of support by Director of National Intelligence for certain workforce activities (sec. 1025(c)) to cover recruitment or retention of the intelligence community workforce; (5) for National Intelligence University (subtitle D of title X), strikes section 1033 and redesignates sections 1034 and 1035 as sections 1033 and 1034, respectively; (6) for measures to mitigate counterintelligence threats from proliferation and use of foreign commercial spyware (sec. 1102A(b)(1)), limits annual reports to five years; and (7) strikes best practices to protect privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of Chinese Americans (title XI, sec. 1110). **(b) Intelligence Authorization Acts** (1) for expansion of security clearances for certain contractors (sec. 6715, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023), strikes subsection (c) and redesignates subsections (d) and (e) as (c) and (d); (2) repeals trends in technologies of strategic importance to the United States (sec. 833, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022); (3) for cooperative actions to detect and counter foreign influence operations (sec. 5323, Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020), strikes subsections (d), (e), and (f) and redesignates subsections (g) and (h) as (d) and (e); (4) repeals assessment of homeland security vulnerabilities associated with certain retired and former personnel of the intelligence community (sec. 5717, Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020); (5) repeals national security effects of global water insecurity and emerging infectious disease and pandemics (sec. 6722, Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020); and (6) for counter active measures by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation states to exert covert influence (sec. 501, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017), strikes subsection (h). **(c) Other provisions of law

This section requires the FBI Director to notify the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence within 30 days after any material change takes effect to a policy or procedure relating to the terrorist watchlist (i.e., Terrorist Screening Dataset or successor) or transnational organized crime watchlist (i.e., under the Transnational Organized Crime Actor Detection Program or successor), including changes to adding or removing persons from either watchlist and a summary of such changes. The section further requires the FBI Director, within 30 days of a request from either intelligence committee, to submit all guidance in effect that applies to or governs use of either watchlist.

This section directs the FBI Director to submit to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence a report by January 31, 2026, and annually thereafter for two years on known or presumed United States persons (as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. 1801) included on the terrorist watchlist (i.e., Terrorist Screening Dataset or successor) during the preceding calendar year. Each report must include (1) total watchlist numbers as of January 1 and December 31; and (2) for U.S. persons as of those dates, numbers on the no-fly list, selectee list for additional screening, and exceptions to the reasonable suspicion standard; names of affiliated terrorist organizations and numbers per organization; and numbers nominated by each federal agency.

This section directs the Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the heads of intelligence community elements, to develop a plan for the intelligence community's use of the proposed web of biological data as described in recommendation 4.1a of the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology's April 2025 report, _Charting the Future of Biotechnology_ (pursuant to section 1091 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022). The Secretary must brief the congressional intelligence committees on the plan not later than 180 days after enactment.